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ABSTRACT
In bioethical discussions of preimplantation genetic
diagnosis and prenatal screening, accusations of
eugenics are commonplace, as are counter-claims that
talk of eugenics is misleading and unhelpful. This paper
asks whether ‘‘eugenics talk’’, in this context, is
legitimate and useful or something to be avoided. It
also looks at the extent to which this linguistic question
can be answered without first answering relevant
substantive moral questions. Its main conclusion is that
the best and most non-partisan argument for avoiding
eugenics talk is the Autonomy Argument. According to
this, eugenics talk per se is not wrong, but there is
something wrong with using its emotive power as a
means of circumventing people’s critical–rational
faculties. The Autonomy Argument does not, however,
tell against eugenics talk when such language is used
to shock people into critical–rational thought. These
conclusions do not depend on unique features of
eugenics: similar considerations apply to emotive
language throughout bioethics.
… opinion ought, in every instance, to determine
its verdict by the circumstances of the individual
case; condemning every one, on whichever side of
the argument he places himself, in whose mode of
advocacy either want of candour, or malignity,
bigotry or intolerance of feeling manifest them-
selves … and giving merited honour to every one,
whatever opinion he may hold, who has calmness
to see and honesty to state what his opponents
and their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing
to their discredit, keeping nothing back which
tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their favour.
This is the real morality of public discussion …
(Mill).
1
In bioethical discussions of preimplantation
genetic diagnosis (PGD) and prenatal screening,
accusations of eugenics are commonplace, as are
counter-claims that this talk of eugenics is mis-
leading and unhelpful.
2–6 This paper asks whether
‘‘eugenics talk’’, in this context, is legitimate and
useful or something to be avoided. It also looks at
the extent to which this linguistic question can be
answered without first answering relevant sub-
stantive moral questions—for example, about the
permissibility of PGD. That is, can we decide on
our moral language prior to, or without commit-
ting ourselves to, a particular substantive moral
view? Many of the arguments discussed here have
general implications for the ways in which,
throughout bioethics, issues of language and of
substance inter-relate.
DEFINING EUGENICS
Although the concern of this paper is with whether
we should use eugenics talk, not with what such
talk means, it will nonetheless be useful first to
say something about how eugenics is defined. The
term was coined in 1883 by Francis Galton.
7 He
defined it as the study of ‘‘the conditions under
which men of a high type are produced’’ and as
‘‘the science which deals with all influences that
improve the inborn qualities of a race’’.
8 Eugenics,
however, is not just a field of study and, as Diane
Paul notes:
… it is less often identified as a science than as a
social movement or policy, as in Bertrand Russell’s
definition, ‘‘the attempt to improve the biological
character of a breed by deliberate methods adopted
to that end’’.
9
Other, similar definitions include those found in
the Oxford English dictionary, which defines eugenic
as ‘‘pertaining or adapted to the production of fine
offspring, esp. in the human race’’, and in the
Routledge encyclopaedia of philosophy, which defines
eugenics as ‘‘the attempt to improve the human
gene pool’’.
10
Most would accept that ‘‘the attempt to
improve the human gene pool’’ is at the heart of
the concept (including even who those who view
such attempts as misguided or immoral). However,
as Paul notes, beyond this, defining eugenics
becomes somewhat controversial and messy:
As a historian of modern genetics, I am often asked
whether human genetics represents disguised, or
incipient, or possibly a new kind of eugenics.
Those who pose the questions may not be certain
how to define eugenics, but they are almost
always convinced that it is a bad thing, one which
should be prevented. Indeed, fear of a eugenics
revival appears to be a principal anxiety aroused by
the Human Genome Project … , in Europe as well
as the United States … While almost everyone
agrees that eugenics is objectionable, there is no
consensus on what it actually is. Indeed, one can
be opposed to eugenics, and for almost anything
(p536).
9
One way of conceptualising these definitional
disagreements is to see them as disputes between
people who want to narrow down the concept
eugenics in certain ways and others who want to
resist these narrowings-down. For instance, some
people want to say that only authoritarian (state-
coerced) eugenics is really eugenics and that (so-
called) ‘‘liberal eugenics’’ (based on individuals’ free
choices) doesn’t count as eugenics; whereas others
want to make a distinction within eugenics
between authoritarian and liberal. Similarly, some
people want to say that only positive eugenics
(thought of as enhancement and/or encouraging
the creation of people with ‘‘better-than-normal’’
traits) is really eugenics and that (so-called)
‘‘negative eugenics’’ (avoiding the births of people
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J Med Ethics 2008;34:467–471. doi:10.1136/jme.2007.021592 467with diseases or ‘‘subnormal’’ traits) doesn’t count as eugenics;
whereas others want to make a distinction within eugenics
between positive and negative. (Habermas
5 (p21) apparently
takes the former view, contrasting ‘‘the prevention of the birth
of a severely afflicted child’’ with ‘‘eugenic choice’’.) Finally,
some people want eugenics to be a moral term, to have
wrongness (or ‘‘wrong-makingness’’) built into it, such that to
call something eugenics is to condemn it; while some others
want it to be a more neutral term that can refer non-critically to
actions that are entirely innocent, or even good.
This latter point is related to (though distinct from) questions
about the emotive force of the term eugenics. During 2005, I
conducted some expert interviews with (among others) UK-
based academics, campaigners and health professionals. One of
my aims was to discover what key participants in debates about
reproductive ethics thought about the term eugenics. Not
surprisingly, the most enthusiastic users of the term were those
campaigners who are generally critical of reproductive and
selection technologies:
We use it [eugenics] whenever we can and we won’t be distracted
or diverted into using any other word, not least because it’s not a
popular word. It’s not a word that people like to hear; it’s got a
lot of nasty connotations. So we’re not going to try to find a
more palatable word. (Campaigner)
On the other side, those with what might be termed ‘‘pro-
choice’’ or ‘‘pro-science’’ views generally avoid the word:
I almost think we should ban the term. If you just say ‘‘eugenic’’
nobody knows what you mean. We should say what it is about
the statement or the policies that we object to, and examine that.
It’s like saying ‘‘you’re a fascist!’’ It’s an unexamined assertion
that’s used for rhetorical effect, so it just seems lazy to me. It’s
not a coherent or well-specified critique. And it’s very insulting to
doctors … (Academic)
I think on any occasion when the issue might be raised there
would probably be a desire to avoid using [the term eugenics]
because of its pejorative connotations. It suggests Nazis before
we even start to consider the issues. (Healthcare professional)
So nearly everyone agrees that eugenics is hugely emotive and
negative. But whereas for some this is a reason to avoid it, for
others this makes the term eugenics a good way of getting their
message across.
REASONS TO AVOID WORDS
In general, what reasons are there for avoiding a particular term
(or for not using it in certain ways)? Five main candidates seem
to crop up in bioethical debates.
c Bad consequences: calling x F would have bad consequences
c Offence: calling x F would cause reasonable offence
c Falsity: x is not F, so calling x F is false
c Misleadingness (strictly, misleadingness-without-falsity): x
is F, but calling it F is nonetheless misleading
c Failure to respect autonomy (strictly, failure to respect
autonomy without misleading): saying that x is F is neither
false nor misleading, but nonetheless encourages non-
autonomous belief-formation.
In what follows, I look at each of these arguments in turn,
making some observations about their structure and their
general strengths and weakness and seeing how they apply to
the term eugenics.
A key question is: are there any arguments against eugenics
talk that do not rely on a particular view of the substantive
moral issues under discussion (for example, that PGD is not
wrongfully eugenic)? Finding arguments of this kind is
important for at least two reasons. First, if arguments about
terminology depend on substantive moral views, then, in
contested areas such as reproductive ethics there will be no
prospect of agreeing the terms in which the bioethical debate
should be conducted and each side will use its own partisan
concepts and terms—an unwelcome situation in which rational
debate will be difficult. Perhaps such stand-offs are inescapable,
but we should at least try to avoid them. Second, people who
are genuinely unsure about how to answer the substantive
moral questions have to decide what concepts and terms to use,
and, for them, being offered nothing but competing partisan
schemas is confusing and unhelpful. So it would be good if we
could offer some terminological guidance for the uncommitted.
What follows then is a search for a non-partisan or ‘‘neutral’’
argument against using eugenics talk—that is, one that does not
depend on taking a particular substantive view about the ethics
of PGD, prenatal diagnosis and so on. For this reason, I will
spend more time on the Autonomy Argument than on the
others, because it seems that this is the most likely to succeed
prior to, or in the absence of, a resolution of the underlying
substantive moral disputes—although even this argument, as
we shall see later, is hard to disentangle from the substantive
bioethical issues.
CONSEQUENCE-BASED ARGUMENTS
There are certainly cases in which the bad consequences of
saying ‘‘F’’ make it wrong to say ‘‘F’’—for example, it may be
wrong to call someone an F (even if they are one) if this will
cause a riot that kills 10 000 people. So we should admit that
sometimes bad consequences constitute over-riding reasons to
avoid saying ‘‘F’’, even if we are not consequentialists and do
not think that maximising good consequences is the only
morally relevant consideration. That being said, purely con-
sequence-based arguments will often be of limited value when
we are deciding whether or not to use terms such as eugenics,
because the different sides in the debate frequently disagree
fundamentally about what counts as a good or bad conse-
quence. For example, those opposed to PGD may think that one
good consequence of calling it eugenics is that people will
associate it with Nazism and oppose it, while those who are in
favour of PGD would view this as a bad outcome. So it looks as
if we need to settle the substantive questions first in order to
deploy this argument. This does not mean that the argument is
unsound, but it is not what I earlier termed ‘‘non-partisan’’—
except in those rather rare cases where there is bipartisan
agreement both about what the likely consequences will be and
about whether these consequences are good or bad.
OFFENCE
Faced with accusations of ‘‘eugenics’’, who might be offended?
The most obvious potential victims are (the allegedly eugeni-
cist) doctors; another group is victims of the Nazi eugenicists,
who may feel that calling PGD eugenics trivialises Nazi
atrocities. The claim that such people will be offended is
plausible. However, as I have argued elsewhere, there is a crucial
distinction between reasonable and unreasonable offence and
(with some qualifications that I will not go into here)
Arguments from Offence are sound only when the offence is
reasonable.
11–13 The rationale for this constraint is that, without
it, Arguments from Offence would oblige us to pander to
people’s wacky beliefs and unduly sensitive natures. What if
Ethics
468 J Med Ethics 2008;34:467–471. doi:10.1136/jme.2007.021592(for example) members of a religious cult found the words
menstruation and pregnant offensive? Would doctors and nurses
be obliged to stop using them in public? No, because any
offence taken would be unreasonable. (Obviously, if the cultists’
offence was justified, that would be another matter, but I am
assuming here that it is not.) So, for eugenics, the question is not
so much ‘‘are people offended?’’, because they are, but rather ‘‘is
their offence reasonable?’’
This means that the Argument from Offence has very little
independent argumentative power. In order to know whether it
works, we need to know whether the offence felt by (for
example) doctors is reasonable. One of the key determinants of
this is the question of whether they really are eugenicists. If
they are, then to take offence at being called a eugenicist may
well be unreasonable because, arguably at least, it is unreason-
able to complain about someone giving a truthful description of
you. If, on the other hand, they are not eugenicists, then the
offence probably is reasonable. So the reasonableness or
otherwise of the doctors’ offence boils down to the question
of whether or not they are eugenicists, which is why the
Argument from Offence lacks independent force. First, it suffers
from a similar problem to the CONSEQUENCE-BASED argument—
namely, we cannot decide the terminological question without
answering one of the major substantive questions (‘‘are they
eugenicists?’’). Second, it collapses into or is parasitic on a
different argument, the Falsity Argument , discussed in the next
section.
Before looking at the Falsity Argument, I should mention
that, contrary to what was just suggested, it is possible for
people to be offended reasonably by accusations of F even if
they are F. The cases I have in mind are ones where F has
negative connotations and sends out a dual message: that A is F
and that being F is bad. Thus, a sex worker might take umbrage
at being called a ‘‘whore’’, not because this term is descriptively
inaccurate, but rather because of the negative evaluation
conveyed. Similarly, a fat person may object to being called fat
when this is done in a way that suggests that there is something
morally or aesthetically wrong with fatness. (These are
obviously oversimplifications but will, I hope, suffice as
illustrative examples.) Even these cases, however, depend on a
sort of Falsity Argument. In particular, the reasonableness of
any offence taken will depend largely on whether the evaluation
conveyed is itself true and justified. If it is—for example, if the
person’s fatness really is reprehensible—then, arguably, taking
offence is not reasonable. If the evaluation conveyed is not true,
however, then taking offence is reasonable, but the moral force
of any Argument from Offence will rely on an underlying
appeal to falsity: on the fact that the implied moral judgement
is untrue.
A further complication is that moral concepts other than
offence are generally in play in these situations. Thus, calling a
fat person fat may still be hurtful and unkind even if the
person’s fatness is reprehensible. So it does not follow from
what I have said about the reasonableness and unreasonableness
of offence that it is always permissible to point out people’s
faults, or that there are no moral constraints on how people’s
faults are discussed.
FALSITY AND MISLEADINGNESS
The Falsity Argument against using F says simply that (other
things being equal) we shouldn’t call x F if x is not F. So, in the
case of eugenics, the Falsity Argument against using the term is
that many of the doctors who are called eugenicists are not
eugenicists. This would, of course, be contested by their critics,
many of whom sincerely believe that they are. All I can say
about this argument, then, is that it takes us straight to an
impasse and is unlikely to help resolve the linguistic issues
unless we already have answers to some of main the substantive
questions, such as ‘‘is PGD eugenics?’’
Turning to misleadingness: sometimes saying that x is F can
mislead people even if x really is F. An example of this is an
incident that occurred in Wales when a paediatrician was
mistaken for a paedophile by some linguistically challenged
vandals and returned home ‘‘to find the outside of her property
daubed with the words ‘‘paedo’’ ’’.
14 At least in some places,
then, calling someone ‘‘a paediatrician’’ is misleading, not to
mention dangerous, even if she really is a paediatrician. Hence,
other terms (such as ‘‘children’s doctor’’) might be preferable.
Thinking along similar lines, some doctors might (in private)
concede that they are eugenicists, in a non-pejorative technical
sense of the word, but wouldn’t want to be branded
‘‘eugenicist’’ because the public understand eugenics in a narrow
and negative way and may think, for example, that eugenicists
are all Nazis. However, against this, some critics of reproductive
technologies will assert that the public’s negative views of
eugenics are quite right and hence the public would not have
been misled if they came to think that all eugenicists believe
in something akin to Nazism. Thus, the Misleadingness
Argument, like the Falsity Argument, takes us to an impasse,
since whether people are misled or not depends on the answer
to one or more of the substantive ethical questions (for
example, about whether eugenics must involve something akin
to Nazism).
Another version of the Misleadingness Argument says that
using the term eugenics is often misleading or confusing because
(as was noted earlier) there is too much disagreement or
confusion about the meaning of the term. According to this
argument, given that several different definitions of eugenics are
in play (Eugenics
DEF1, Eugenics
DEF2, Eugenics
DEF3, Eugenics
DEF4 and so
on) and that different people will therefore take eugenics claims
to mean different things, it is best to avoid the term altogether
in order to avoid spreading confusion.
There seem to be two problems with this version of the
Misleadingness Argument against eugenics talk. First, there are
ways of reducing or eliminating such misunderstandings,
notably, getting speakers to say what they mean by eugenics.
Thus, one person may say that they are using Eugenics
DEF1, while
another admits to using Eugenics
DEF4. The debate can then
proceed with clarity and, even if participants disagree about
what the best or correct definition is, they can at least know
what each other mean. Obviously, this will not be practicable in
all situations (in news media encounters, for example, there will
rarely be an opportunity to define terms), but getting people to
say what they mean could deal with many of the possible
misunderstandings.
Second, there is a consistency or ‘‘absurd implications’’
problem with the argument. For if we in general stopped using
terms with contested definitions or those about whose meaning
there was confusion, then (at least in ethics) we wouldn’t be left
with many terms. All of the following key terms (to name just a
few) have contested definitions and using them can cause
confusion: autonomy, bioethics, consent, euthanasia, freedom, harm,
health, justice and person. But this is not a sufficient reason to
give up on these terms (especially given the point just made
about the possibility of clarification). Furthermore, given the
apparent importance of the underlying concepts, the chances
are that people would just concoct other (perhaps equally
confusing) words for autonomy, health, personhood and the
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would just make matters worse.
Now, it could be argued that that people are even more
confused about eugenics than, say, autonomy, although person-
ally I find this rather implausible and it is hard to know how
this could be established: through some kind of socioscientific
survey of ethical confusion, perhaps. Alternatively, one might
argue that, whereas these other bioethical concepts or terms are
worth saving, eugenics is not. But this auxiliary argument is
based on considerations other than the fact that there is too
much disagreement or confusion about the meaning of eugenics
and so takes us beyond the Misleadingness Argument, rather
than being a defence or a version of the argument. Furthermore,
for reasons discussed earlier, I suspect that people’s views about
whether the idea of the term eugenics is worth saving will be
closely tied to their substantive moral views about the subject
of eugenics; hence, we will once again arrive at a partisan
impasse.
I conclude, therefore, that the Misleadingness Argument
against eugenics talk is quite weak, although clearly we should
all strive to avoid using the term (and indeed all other terms) in
misleading ways and should, where practicable, define our
terms.
FAILURE TO RESPECT AUTONOMY
The idea here is that there are some ways of communicating
that, without lying or misleading, fail to respect people’s
autonomy: methods of communication that circumvent or
neutralise people’s critical–rational faculties. Non-rational per-
suasion is, of course, ubiquitous and it would be wildly
implausible to suggest that it is always wrong. However, it
may be wrong in some circumstances, and it seems plausible to
suppose that we usually respect people’s autonomy more when
we use rational rather than non-rational persuasive means and
that there should therefore be a presumption in favour of
rational means. This idea underlies the Autonomy Argument
against using eugenics talk.
Sometimes, when addressing bioethical issues, people use
images to generate ‘‘moral intuitions’’. For example, there are
numerous antiabortion and antivivisection websites that con-
tain gruesome images of aborted fetuses and mutilated animals.
In such cases, there is not (or need not be) any lying or
distortion taking place (that is, the alleged pictures of aborted
fetuses are, as far as I can tell, really pictures of aborted fetuses),
but even so, and even if abortion were wrong, there would still
be a worry regarding autonomy about this way of getting the
message across. One part of the concern is that the use of
images bypasses people’s critical–rational faculties and consti-
tutes manipulation
i.
15 16 Another is that we should not
encourage people to base their ethical views on the way things
look, since this is an ineffective way of acquiring moral
knowledge.
The Autonomy Argument against eugenics talk then focuses
on the fact that the word eugenics is highly emotive. The
problem with emotive language is that, like explicit images, it
encourages people to disengage their critical–rational faculties
and to form moral views based on irrelevant or superficial
features. So, given that all sides agree that eugenics talk is
emotive, there seems to be a strong (and non-partisan)
Autonomy Argument against using it: the claim being that
eugenics talk, especially if part of a concerted effort to alter
others’ moral beliefs, is a failure to fully respect people’s
autonomy, because it attempts to circumvent their critical–
rational faculties.
OBJECTIONS TO THE AUTONOMY ARGUMENT
The Autonomy Argument faces several objections.
The first is simply an appeal to counter-examples. Take, for
instance, the terms genocide and Nazi. Surely it is okay to call
genocide genocide and Nazis Nazis even though these terms are
highly emotive, more so than eugenics. So why doesn’t the same
go for eugenics: what’s wrong with calling eugenics eugenics? A
lot depends on the details of the case and, even in the case of the
Nazis, there may sometimes be a defensible Autonomy
Argument for not calling them Nazis. Imagine, for example,
that we are having an academic–historical debate about
whether an individual Nazi was responsible for a crime. One
can certainly imagine circumstances in which referring to the
person as ‘‘a Nazi’’ would cloud people’s judgements and
encourage them not to use their critical–rational faculties. So
these examples, genocide and Nazi, are not compelling; like
eugenics, it may sometimes be wrong to use these terms, and for
the very same reasons.
The second objection says that it is acceptable to use emotive
language when this is the best way of getting people to hold
true beliefs. Perhaps this is not so much an objection to the
Autonomy Argument as an independent argument against its
conclusion and what we have here is a clash between competing
values or principles: respect for people’s autonomy versus the
desirability of true belief. We cannot reasonably assert that true
belief will never win out, and there probably are some extreme
cases in which true belief should be prioritised over autonomy.
Nonetheless, there are some (perhaps non-decisive) reasons for
having a fairly strong presumption in favour of allowing
autonomy to prevail.
To start with, there is a non-accidental connection (though
not one I will attempt to explain here) between forming beliefs
autonomously, through a process of independent deliberation
and reasoning, and having true beliefs. In particular, delibera-
tion and reasoning, at least in the long term, deliver a better
truth ratio (the proportion of a person’s beliefs that are true). If
this is the case, then it justifies a presumption in favour of
allowing and encouraging people to form beliefs in this way,
although there may be exceptional cases in which non-rational
means are the best way of getting people to believe particular
truths. Moreover, for one person to impose views on another
using non-rational persuasion smacks of a certain kind of
arrogance, of a failure to recognise one’s own epistemic
shortcomings (or the possibility of such shortcomings), and
perhaps also of a certain cowardice about exposing one’s own
ideas to rational critique. These are the kinds of concerns that
people have about religious cults and charismatic political
leaders: that they aim to promulgate their beliefs non-rationally,
rather than offering them to us as candidates for independent
critical assessment.
Finally, a third objection to the Autonomy Argument accuses
it of relying on an extreme form of linguistic Puritanism. One
way of framing the problem is: can the Autonomy Argument
advocate the avoidance of emotive language in bioethics
without implausibly entailing its avoidance in other areas such
as the arts? It looks as if the answer to this must be ‘‘no’’,
because emotive language will often have the very same effects
in the arts as it does in bioethics: that is, it will (sometimes)
bypass people’s critical–rational faculties and affect their views,
by non-rational means. Thus, proponents of the Autonomy
iManipulation is a complicated and underexplored moral concept. For further
discussion, see Kligman and Culver
15 (pp173–97) and Rudinow
16 (pp338–47).
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artistic expression, and this looks like a reductio ad absurdum.
This is not, however, a decisive objection, although a certain
amount of bullet-biting is required. The first move in defending
the Autonomy Argument is to point out that emotive language
can be deployed for various purposes. One is to foist beliefs on
people by circumventing their critical–rational faculties. This, it
seems to me, is a prima facie objectionable use of emotive
language, and it can arise in the arts, bioethics, TV advertising
and elsewhere. (This admission of generality is the bullet-
biting.) However, there are many other purposes to which
emotive language can be put. One is to cause aesthetic or
emotional experiences (without manipulating people’s beliefs).
Another is to encourage people to use their critical–rational
faculties, perhaps by shocking them into thinking about
something previously unquestioned. The importance of this is
that when emotive language is used in the arts, it is not always,
or even usually, done to foist beliefs on people. More often than
not, it has other aims and so is not a target of the Autonomy
Argument. Thus, while (as I have conceded) the Autonomy
Argument condemns some artistic works for their use of emotive
language (when they aim, like propaganda, at belief-manipula-
tion), it is not as puritanical as was suggested earlier, and it is
compatible with a permissive view of much artistic emotive
language.
In this way, the Autonomy Argument is saved from the
apparent reductio ad absurdum. However, if the arts and
bioethics are essentially the same (as far as emotive language is
concerned), then the defence used by artists can also be used by
bioethicists. In particular, users of emotive language may argue,
as one of my interviewees did:
We use it [eugenics] in the same way as we use the word apartheid
to talk about the discrimination that we face because that is,
from our perspective, the reality. It does shock, and it needs to
shock people into looking at the real situation for disabled people.
One of the major problems is that we’re really not seen as human
beings, and therefore people’s attitudes to us need to be startled
… (Campaigner)
So in bioethics, as in the arts, emotive language can be used to
shock people into thinking critically about something previously
unquestioned and, when it is used for this purpose, there is no
autonomy-based objection to it.
The Autonomy Argument, then, is partially successful. It
provides us with good reasons to avoid eugenics talk, but only
where such talk is a means of circumventing people’s critical–
rational faculties. Eugenics talk is often used in this way, but we
must also concede that it can be used in the opposite way, to
arouse and engage people’s critical–rational faculties; in these
cases there is no failure to respect autonomy.
CONCLUSIONS
It seems that the best and most non-partisan argument for
avoiding eugenics talk is the Autonomy Argument. According to
the version of this argument just outlined, eugenics talk per se is
not wrong. However, there is something wrong with using its
emotive power as a means of circumventing people’s critical–
rational faculties: a process that is analogous to the use of
gruesome images of fetuses and animals to persuade people to
oppose abortion and animal experimentation. Such methods
can bypass or distort people’s reasoning processes and, when
this happens, there can be a failure fully to respect their
autonomy.
However, in defence of eugenics talk, we have also seen that
it may be justified when it is used to ‘‘shock people into’’
thinking critically about subjects that they otherwise
wouldn’t—provided of course that these are subjects that they
ought to think about or have views on (thus, I presume, shocking
people into thinking about crochet or train-spotting would be
unjustified). In addition, there may be cases in which over-
riding autonomy is justified in order to get people to hold
significant true beliefs. So even the Autonomy Argument
cannot be separated entirely from substantive bioethical views,
because questions about which views are important and/or true
will determine the extent of its applicability.
These conclusions do not depend on unique features of
eugenics, and so similar considerations apply to emotive
language throughout bioethics. For instance, describing abortion
as ‘‘butchering unborn children’’ or NHS resource limitations as
‘‘the government’s euthanasia programme’’
17 will perhaps fall
foul of the Autonomy Argument; but then again, if these words
are used to shock people into a critical–rational thought process,
using them may be permissible or good.
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